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Abstract. Physical unclonable functions are devices that exploit small, random
variations in a manufacturing process to create unique and stable identifying behavior.
These devices have found a variety of security applications, from intellectual property
protection to secret key generation. In this work, we propose a framework for
constructing physical unclonable functions from hybrid Boolean networks realized on
field-programmable gate arrays. These networks are highly sensitive to propagation
delay and other non-ideal behavior introduced by the silicon fabrication process and
thus provide a source of entropy generation that is amplified by chaotic dynamics. We
leverage this behavior in the context of physical unclonable functions by setting the
initial state of the network to a specified Boolean string (the challenge) and measuring
the state of the network some time later (the response). Due to the non-equilibrium
nature of the proposed protocol, challenge-response pairs can be collected at a rapid
rate of up to 100 MHz. Moreover, we collect multiple response bits per challenge,
in contrast to many proposed techniques. We find a high degree of reliability and
uniqueness from the proposed devices, respectively characterized by µintra = 6.68%
and µinter = 47.25% for a moderately sized device. We estimate the available entropy
in devices of varying size with several statistical tests and find that the entropy scales
exponentially with the size of the network.
Keywords: Physical Unclonable Functions · Field Programmable Gate Arrays ·
Boolean networks
1 Introduction
The creation, storage, and distribution of cryptographic keys remains an active area of
research due to the ever-increasing demand for privacy protection and secure computing
[ZDMW16, BH15, TŠK07]. One attractive approach towards these problems is the concept
of a physical unclonable function (PUF). A PUF with the appropriate security properties is
capable of generating secure keys “on the fly,” and effectively storing them in the physical
details of the device. Some devices, so-called “strong PUFS” [RBK10, MBW+19], contain
an exponentially large number of independent keys, making attempts to extract all of
them from a compromised device a difficult or impossible task.
Physical unclonable functions are physical devices that process an input, called a
challenge, and produce an output, called a response. A particular PUF instance is a
member of a PUF class, all the members of which are created by some construction process
that is subject to small, random variations. To be appropriate for security applications,
PUFs must have the following properties:
• Reliability: Given a particular PUF instance, the responses resulting from successive
evaluations of the same challenge are identical up to a small error.
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2 Transient Response of Hybrid Boolean Networks as Physical Unclonable Functions
• Uniqueness: Given two PUF instances and a particular challenge, the resulting
responses are very different.
• Unclonability: Due to the nature of the construction process, no two PUF instances
are likely to have identical challenge-response behavior.
• Unpredictability: Even with knowledge of the construction process, it is difficult or
impossible to infer the response to one challenge given the response to a different
challenge.
In this work, we propose a strong PUF class that has these properties, which we
quantify in Sections 4 and 5. A response to a given challenge can be extracted from a PUF
instance in as little as 10 ns. The PUFs require only a small number of resources for a
desired amount of entropy in comparison to similar PUF proposals fabricated in silicon.
Further, the presence of chaos in the challenge-response process may result in resilience to
machine-learning based attacks [LHH18].
The proposed device is a hybrid of an autonomous Boolean network (ABN) and
synchronous, clocked logic, resulting in a hybrid Boolean network (HBN). It is constructed
on a readily-available electronic platform known as a field-programmable gate array (FPGA).
The autonomous portion of the network is based on a variant of a physical random number
generator known to produce random bits at a rate of 100 Mb/s [Ros15, RRG13]. The
evolution of the HBN from an initial state is highly sensitive to the manufacturing details,
including propagation delays and degradation effects. We leverage this phenomenon to
construct a class of PUFs by considering the challenge to be the initial state of the ABN
and the response to be the state of the synchronous portion some time later.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we describe our proposed
HBN-PUF design in detail. In Section 3, we describe the setup of the experiments used
to validate the proposed design. In Section 4, we discuss the reliability and uniqueness
measurements. In Section 5, we discuss a number of entropy estimates. Finally, we
conclude and discuss further research directions in Section 6.
2 HBN-PUF Design
In this section, we describe the details of the HBN-PUF and its implementation, including
how responses are produced from challenges. As motivation, we begin by describing
previous work on a similarly designed HBN for random number generation.
2.1 HBN for Random Number Generation
As noted in the introduction, much attention in the field of cryptography is devoted
towards cryptographic keys. Many protocols for secure communication, including the
popular Rivest–Shamir–Adleman cryptosystem [JK03], rely on the generation of random
numbers for encryption of secure data. Generating random numbers as quickly as possible
prevents the storage of encryption keys and thereby increases the security of their usage.
One approach to random number generation that produces extremely high random bit
rates is based on an HBN [Ros15, RRG13] and referred to here as an HBN-RNG. The idea
is to create a chaotic physical system on an FPGA whose dynamics rapidly approach the
maximum frequency allowed by the hardware due to the finite rise- and fall-times of the
logic elements (LEs) on the FPGA. The system should also exhibit self-excitation and not
be biased towards logical high or low.
A circuit satisfying these properties can be realized with a particular HBN and is
depicted in Figure 1a-1d. The ABN is formed from a ring of N nodes, where each node is
bidirectionally coupled along the ring as well as coupled to itself. All but one of the nodes
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Figure 1: a) A size N = 16 HBN-RNG. Random numbers are read from the state of the
clocked readout. b-d) The components of the HBN-RNG, where the number appearing
above wires indicates how many wires are present. e) A N = 16 HBN-PUF. The response
is read from the clocked readout after one clock cycle. The initial conditions of the
autonomous portion are specified by the challenge string. The network is released from
initial conditions by changing the value of the RESET bit. The response is read only a
short time after release from initial conditions, and is therefor highly dependent upon the
challenge and small differences in propagation delays and degradation effects within the
nodes. f, g) The components of the HBN-PUF. Again, the number appearing above wires
indicates how many wires are present.
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execute the 3-input XOR operation, returning 1 if an even number of inputs are 1, and 0
otherwise. One of the nodes instead executes the XNOR operation, which is the logical
negation of the XOR operation. This node breaks the rotational symmetry of the ring and
forces self-excitation of the system.
The clocked portion of the HBN-RNG is a clocked-readout that registers the state of 4
of the ABN nodes on the rising edge of some global clock. To ensure an unbiased output,
the registered values are passed through a final XOR gate to reduce the bias in the output
bit stream.
A transition to chaos in the HBN-RNG occurs at N = 5 above which the network
becomes exponentially sensitive to initial conditions and LE parameter details. An efficient
RNG can be realized with 128 copies of N = 16 networks running in parallel, resulting in
a 12.8 GHz random bit rate.
2.2 HBN Physical Unclonable Functions
The physical random number generator described above is "PUF-like" in a number of
ways. First, the dynamics are highly sensitive to initial conditions and details of their
underlying physical circuitry. These properties follow from the presence of chaos and
together imply the uniqueness property discussed in Section 1. Second, the HBN-RNG and
similar ABNs [DLHG16] have transients that can last many orders-of-magnitude longer
than the characteristic time-scale of the network, which is on the order of hundreds of
picoseconds. This suggests a window of stability in the transient HBN response, where
the network state is reliable in the sense discussed in Section 1 while retaining significant
information about the physical details.
With these considerations in mind, the HBN-RNG scheme can be modified to act as a
physical unclonable function or HBN-PUF. In particular, we make the following changes:
• Replace each node with an XOR LE and a multiplexer that sets the initial state of
the ABN to a particular value, as shown in Figure 1f.
• Read the entire ABN state at the clocked readout, once, on a timescale comparable
to the correlation time of the ABN, thereby capturing the transient response of the
network. This is shown in Figure 1g.
The first change is to make the network challengeable, as will be discussed later in this
section. Note that the XNOR node is also replaced with an XOR node so that the ring is
symmetric and does not self-excite from the all-0 state.
The second change is to ensure that the state of the clocked readout is correlated with
the initial state, containing information about it in some complicated way. The idea here
is that the transient response of the network depends both on the initial conditions and
the details of the LEs that form the HBN. Because the transient is short-lasting, we only
make one measurement of the clocked readout to form the response.
The proposed HBN-PUF is challenged by a binary string C by setting the initial state
of the network to C, according to some fixed but arbitrary labeling of the nodes. At t = 0,
the RESET bit is flipped to 0, allowing the ABN to evolve. At a short time τ later, the
state of the ABN is registered by the clocked readout and is later read by an on-chip
memory controller. The measured state of the clocked readout is the response R of the
HBN-PUF to the challenge C. A schematic of the HBN-PUF is shown in Figure 1e.
It is clear from the description above that an HBN-PUF class is characterized by two
parameters N and τ . Each device of size N requires 3N FPGA resources to synthesize
(the extra element per node being the multiplexer, compared to the HBN-RNG). We refer
to τ as the measurement time.
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3 Experimental Setup
To characterize and validate our proposed design, we synthesize the HBNs on a Cyclone
V GX 5CGXFC5C6F27C7N FPGA. To efficiently characterize intra-device statistics, we
synthesize many different oscillators at different locations on a single chip and challenge
them simultaneously. The physical differences in the LEs that form the different oscillators
are proxies for the physical differences in oscillators fabricated on separate chips.
The HBN-PUFs are characterized by N and τ , as discussed in Section 2.2. In principle,
τ should be optimized in a way that depends on the LE timescales and potentially N .
However, we find that τ is best kept as small as the FPGA’s global clock allows, or about
5 ns for the FPGA used in these experiments. We therefore fix τ = 5 ns, but note that the
effective measurement time might potentially be reduced by various means.
Experiments on a PUF class are further characterized by the number of synthesized
oscillators Noscs, the number of challenges Nchal for which responses from each oscillator
are measured, and the number of measurements Nmeas for each PUF and challenge. As
noted in Section 2.2, a single PUF of size N requires only 3N LEs to synthesize, including
reset logic and synchronous measurement logic. This means that extremely large PUFs
are possible on modern FPGAs, which can feature one million or more LEs. However,
we focus on smaller N to acquire good statistics on various performance metrics in the
following sections.
We consider the space of valid challenges to be all possible bit strings of length N that
are not steady-states. For all N , this means we exclude the all-0 or all-1 state. For even
N , we must also exclude the states with alternating 0’s and 1’s. Thus, the number of valid
challenges is given by
Nvc =
{
2N − 2 Nodd
2N − 4 Neven. (1)
In either case, the number of bits read per challenge is N . The extractable bits from our
proposed design may potentially scale as N2N , resulting in a strong PUF.
4 Reliability and Uniqueness
In this section, we discuss reliability and uniqueness tests based on measurements of intra-
and inter-device statistics. We first define some notation and explain how the statistics
quantify that reliability and uniqueness properties discussed in Section 1. We then describe
the experiments and discuss their results.
4.1 Intra- and Inter-Device Statistics
Let P be the set of all possible PUFs belonging to a certain PUF class, and let C be the set
of all valid challenges for that class. A response of a PUF instance P in P on a challenge
C in C is a measurement of a random variable R whose distribution depends on P and C,
i.e.,
RP (C)← P (C). (2)
Broadly speaking, we want to quantify the reliability and uniqueness of the PUF class by
studying the distribution of various functions of R. In particular, reliability is related to
R when different measurements correspond to the same PUF and same challenge. On
the other hand, uniqueness is related to R when different measurements correspond to
different PUFs and the same challenge.
Towards the ends mentioned above, we define the following random variable
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DintraP (C) = dist(RP(C), R′P(C)), (3)
where dist(RP (C), R′P (C)) is the fractional Hamming distance between two distinct re-
sponse measurements RP (C) and R′P (C) on a fixed PUF instance P on a given challenge
C. The fractional Hamming distance is defined as the proportion of differing bits between
two binary strings. Similarly, we define
DinterP,P ′ (C) = dist(RP(C), RP′(C)), (4)
where dist(RP (C), RP ′(C)) is the fractional Hamming distance between two distinct
response measurements RP (C) and RP ′(C) on two different PUF instances P and P ′ on
a given challenge C.
The statistics of the first random variable DintraP (C) quantify the reliability of the
response of a given PUF to a given challenge because it corresponds to the difference in
successive responses of a single PUF to a single challenge. Ideally, the PUF produces a
response free of error, in which case DintraP (C) is 0 with probability 1 for each PUF P and
challenge C. On the other hand, DinterP,P ′ (C) is a measure of uniqueness, or the ability to
distinguish two PUF instances P and P ′, because it corresponds to difference in responses
of two different PUF instances. If the PUF instances are perfectly distinguishable, then
the response of PUF P will have no correlation with the response of PUF P ′, in which
case DinterP,P ′ (C) will be 0.5 with probability 1 for every pair of PUF instances P and P ′
and challenge C.
Figure 2: Histogram data for intra-device (red) and inter-device (blue) statistics. The
means of the distributions are indicated by vertical dashed lines.
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4.2 Experiments and Results
To understand these distributions, we synthesize Noscs = 16 for various values of N . The
response of each of these oscillators toNchal = 100, chosen randomly, is repeatedly measured
Nmeas = 20 times. We average the data over PUF instances and plot the distributions
in Figure 2, which approximate Dintra/interP (C). The means of these distributions are
commonly referred to as µintra and µinter, respectively, and are represented by vertical
dashed lines. These values indicate the reliability and uniqueness of two randomly chosen
PUF instances with respect to a randomly chosen challenge.
We find the µinter to be close to the ideal value of 0.5 for the values of N investigated.
We find that µintra increases slightly from 0.05 to 0.1, away from the ideal value of 0.
Further, it is clear from Figure 2 that the tightness of these distributions increases with
increasing N . The large separation of the distributions indicates that PUF instances are
highly distinguishable from a small number of challenge-response pairs. They further
confirm the motivation for the HBN-PUF as discussed in Section 3, i.e., that the transient
response of the HBN is highly correlated with the initial state (hence the small value of
µintra) and is very sensitive to small differences in the LEs that form the HBN (hence
µinter being close to 0.5).
5 Entropy Analysis
In the security analysis of PUFs, the extractable entropy is of central importance. This
quantity is ultimately related to both reliability and uniqueness and provides an upper-
bound on the amount of information that can be securely exchanged with a PUF instance
[TŠS+05]. The extractable entropy is difficult to estimate directly, as it is formed from
probability distributions in exponentially high dimensional spaces. We describe in this
section several ways to estimate the entropy from limited data. In what follows, all
logarithms are in base 2.
5.1 Min-Entropy
The min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as
Hmin(X) = −log(pmax(X)), (5)
where pmax(X) is the probability of the most likely outcome. If X = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is a
vector of n independent random variables, then the min entropy is
Hmin(X) =
n∑
i=1
−log(pmax(xi)). (6)
The entropy is often estimated from Equation 6 in the case of memory-based PUFs
[HBF09, SvdSvdL12], where each xi is the random variable corresponding to the probability
that the i-th memory cell will be 1 when measured. The independence of these cells is
often assumed, although dependencies have been found to exist [Mae16]. Given the explicit
coupling in our PUF design, the independence is even less obvious. Nonetheless, we start in
this section by assuming independence and calculating the min-entropy. The calculation of
the min-entropy scales sub-exponentially with N and thus allows us to efficiently estimate
an upper bound for the entropy of large-N devices. In the next section, we refine this
assumption with the empirical mutual information between bit pairs to get a more accurate
estimate of the entropy in low N devices.
In the case of a strong PUF with multiple challenges and a large response space, we
need an ordering of the response bits in order to make sense of entropy calculations, such
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Table 1: An illustration of response-bit ordering for N = 3, where there are 3 ∗ 6 = 18
total bits.
Challenge Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
001 x1 x2 x3
010 x4 x5 x6
011 x7 x8 x9
100 x10 x11 x12
101 x13 x14 x15
110 x16 x17 x18
Table 2: Min entropy and min entropy densities.
N Hmin ρmin
8 1.6× 103 0.80
16 1.2× 107 0.69
32 3.3× 1012 0.75
64 5.6× 1022 0.75
as in Equation 6. A natural ordering is to define the response of the i-th node to the j-th
challenge as xjN+i, where the challenges are ordered lexicographically. This is illustrated
in Table 1 for the simple case of N = 3. Here, there are only 6 challenges because we omit
the trivial all-0 and all-1 challenges, as discussed in Section 3.
Assuming independence of the xi, the min-entropy for the HBN-PUF can be readily
calculated with Equation 6 from empirical estimates of pmax(xi). We estimate these values
for N = 8, 16, 32, 64 with Noscs = 16, Nchal = 100, and Nmeas = 100, as described in
Section 3. For each xi, the estimate of pmax(xi) is simply the observed frequency of 0 or
1, whichever is larger. Although we are not measuring these values for all of the possible
valid challenges, we assume that the randomly chosen challenges form a representative
sample. The results are presented in Table 2.
To put the entropy calculations into context, we also present them as a fraction of the
optimal case. If all of the xi were independent and completely unbiased, i.e., each xi were
equally likely to be 0 or 1, than the min-entropy would be equal to N times the number of
valid challenges Nvc. We therefore define the min-entropy density as
ρmin = Hmin/(NNvc), (7)
where Nvc is defined in Equation 1.
We see from Table 2 that the HBN-PUFs have min-entropy approximately 70% to 80%
of full min-entropy. For comparison, various standard electronic PUFs have min-entropy
between 51% and 99%–see, e.g., Reference [Mae16] for a more complete comparison. The
HBN-PUF therefore has min-entropy density comparable to state-of-the-art techniques.
Another interpretation of the min-entropy is that it is equal to the number of bits one
can securely exchange if an adversary only knew about the biases of the xi. From Table 2,
one can exchange 5.6× 1022 bits of information against a naïve adversary. This HBN-PUF
uses only 3 ∗ 64 = 192 LEs, which is extremely compact comapared to other FPGA-based
PUF designs, and hence we can easily increase the entropy by increasing the size of the
ring.
5.2 Impact of Joint Probability Distribution
Although we assume in the previous section that xi are independent, this is only approx-
imately the case. Correlations between bit pairs do exist, and some structure to these
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correlations appears to develop at higher N . We study these correlations by calculating
the mutual information, defined as
I(xi, xj) =
∑
xi,xj
p(xi, xj)log
[
p(xi, xj)
p(xi)p(xj)
]
(8)
between all pairs of xi, xj . Unlike min-entropy, the mutual information is difficult to
calculate for higher N , so we will restrict our attention to N = 3− 8. We calculate the
mutual information for small N with Noscs = 32, Nchal = Nvc, and Nmeas = 100. For
N = 7, regions with non-trivial mutual information (> 0.05 bits) are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: A visualization of the regions with high mutual information, which make up
0.35% of the total space.
From Figure 3, we see that that peaks of non-trivial mutual information are sparse in
the space of xi, xj pairs and have some structure. In particular, segments of non-trivial
mutual information with slope 1 indicate portions of challenges that yield information
about other challenges, which are apparently related. An adversary can use knowledge
of this structure to more effectively guess response bits, thereby reducing the available
entropy. In particular, the entropy is reduced to [Mae16]
Hjoint = Hmin −
n−1∑
i=0
I(xi, xi+1), (9)
where the ordering of the bits is such that the penalty is as large as possible. Calculating
the ordering of the bits to maximize the joint information penalty is effectively a traveling
salesman problem, which we solve approximately with a 2-opt algorithm [CKT99]. The
resulting entropy estimates are tabulated in Table 3, along with entropy density estimates
defined analogously to Equation 7. Our estimates of the joint-entropy density is, on average,
5% less than our estimates of the min-entropy. This is similar to other electronic PUF
designs, where the joint-entropy estimate is between 2.9% and 8.24% less. See Reference
[Mae16] for a detailed comparison.
Although the existence of non-zero mutual information lowers the amount of infor-
mation that can be securely exchanged, calculating the mutual information directly is a
computationally inefficient task. Such estimates, and therefore such attacks, are difficult
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Table 3: Min entropy, joint entropy, and joint entropy densities for N = 3 − 8. Joint
entropy density estimates are similar to many other FPGA-based PUF designs.
N Hmin Hjoint ρjoint
3 14.5 14.4 0.80
4 39.1 37.9 0.79
5 117 110 0.73
6 301 285 0.79
7 725 661 0.75
8 1610 1340 0.66
to calculate for large N. Three-bit correlations almost certainly exist, but are even more
difficult to estimate, so it’s unclear that that entropy is much smaller than our joint-entropy
estimates in practice, although a machine-learning attack may reveal such dependencies
efficiently [RSS+10].
5.3 Context Tree Weighting Test
In this subsection, we estimate the entropy through a string compression test. In particular,
we consider the context tree weighting (CTW) algorithm [WST95]. This algorithm takes a
binary string called the context and forms an ensemble of models that predict subsequent
bits in the string. It then losslessly compresses subsequent strings into a codeword using
the prediction model. If the context contains information about a subsequent string, then
the codeword will be of reduced size.
In the context of PUFs, the codeword length has been show to approach the true
entropy of the generating source in the limit of unbounded tree depth [ISS+06]. However,
the required memory scales exponentially with tree depth, so it is not computationally
feasible to consider an arbitrarily deep tree in the CTW algorithm. Instead, we vary the
tree depth up to D = 20 to optimize the compression. Nonetheless, the results in this
section should be understood as an upper-bound for the true entropy, especially for larger
N .
We perform a CTW compression as follows.
1. We collect data for N = 3 − 8 HBN-PUFs with Noscs = 32, Nchal = Nvc, and
Nmeas = 1.
2. We concatenate the resulting measurements for all but one PUF instances into a 1D
string of length (Noscs − 1)NvcN to be used as context.
3. We apply the CTW algorithm to compress the measurements from the last PUF
with the context, using various tree depths to optimize the result.
4. We repeat steps 2-3, omitting measurements from a different PUF instance, until all
PUFs have been compressed.
The results of this compression test are presented in Table 4.
The final entropy estimate is the average codeword length from all of the compression
tests described above. If the behavior of the Noscs− 1 PUF instance can be used to predict
the behavior of the unseen instance, then the PUFs do not have full entropy. The codeword
length is simply the number of additional bits required to encode the PUF instance’s
challenge-response behavior.
Consistent with the expectation that this is an upper-bound estimate, the entropies
are all larger than those calculated with the joint-entropy test in Section 5.2. Most of
the PUF data is resistance to compression, particularly those with higher N , although
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Table 4: Entropy and entropy density, as estimated from the CTW compression test. The
entropy estimate is simply the average codeword length. Note that this is an upper-bound
of the true entropy due to the bounded tree-depth.
N HCTW ρCTW
3 17.9 0.993
4 43.8 0.913
5 148 0.984
6 356 0.99
7 882 1.00
8 2016 1.00
it is likely the case that higher N require a deeper tree to compress. These results are
again similar to studies on other FPGA-based PUFs, which find CTW compression rates
between 49% and 100% [KKR+12]. This test is another indication that HBN-PUFs have
near full entropy.
5.4 Entropy Summary
In this section, we describe three different statistical tests to estimate the entropy in
the HBN-PUFs. Two of the tests are computationally intensive and only performed on
HBN-PUFs of size N = 3− 8. One is more easily scalable, which we evaluate for N up to
64, but may be an overly optimistic estimate. To better understand these estimates as a
function of N and resource size, these three estimates are shown in Figure 4.
The HCTW estimate yields the most entropy, followed by Hmin and Hjoint. This is
expected because HCTW is an upper-bound estimate, while Hjoint is equal to Hmin with
a penalty term determined by mutual information. Nonetheless, all three estimates are
reasonably close, particularly on the scale in Figure 4. Further, the functional form of
Hmin is convex on a log-log scale, suggesting exponential growth with N .
Figure 4: A summary of the entropy results. The Hmin (blue) curve suggests exponential
growth. All three curves are reasonably close within the N = 3− 8 window.
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These results suggest that HBN-PUFs are not only strong in the sense that their
challenge space is exponentially large in resource size, but that their entropy is exponentially
large as well. This is important distinction because, for most security applications, a
challenge-response pair that is knowable by an adversary is of no use. Many previously
reported strong PUFs have been shown explicitly to be susceptible to model-building
attacks [RSS+10]. Though it remains to be seen if the HBN-PUF is resistant to such
attacks, the exponential scaling of the entropy estimates suggests this may not be the case.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
In this work, we introduce the concept of an HBN-PUF. We describe its construction on
FPGAs and how the challenge-response process is executed. We quantify the uniqueness
and reliability of HBN-PUF instances of varying size with standard intra- and inter-device
statistics. Finally, we present three entropy estimates for HBN-PUF instances of varying
size.
We find intra- and inter-device statistics in line with many previously reported PUF
designs. They are close to ideal and have tight distributions, suggesting the HBN-PUFs
to be candidates for device authentication purposes. Further, entropy estimates suggests
HBN-PUFs are strong in the sense that their entropy scales exponentially with resource
count. This means HBN-PUFs constructed from on the order of hundreds of LEs can
efficiently store trillions or more independent cryptographic keys in their physical structure.
Several future lines of inquiry are suggested by this work. In particular, the impact
of temperature and voltage variations is not studied here. Quantifying the response
variation to varying environments is important for practical PUF applications [MSA+14]
and deserves to be studied in the case of HBN-PUFs. Additionally, we have not studied the
ability of machine learning techniques to perform a model-building attack. These attacks
have been shown to make other strong PUFs vulnerable, and the question needs to be
investigated here as well.
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A Verilog codes
In these appendices, we briefly present Verilog codes for synthesizing an HBN-PUF.
A.1 Node
We present Verilog code for synthesizing a single HBN-PUF node in Listing 1. This node
corresponds to the schematic in Figure 1f.
1 module Node ( r e s e t , cha l l enge , i n l e f t , i n r i gh t , out ) ;
2
3 input r e s e t ;
4 input cha l l eng e ;
5 input i n l e f t ;
6 input i n r i g h t ;
7 output out ;
8
9 wire node_internal ;
10 wire node_external ;
11
12 a s s i gn node_internal = i n l e f t ^ node_external ^ i n r i g h t ;
13 a s s i gn node_external = r e s e t ? cha l l eng e : node_internal ;
14 a s s i gn out = node_external ;
15
16 endmodule
A.2 HBN-PUF
We present Verilog code for synthesizing a single HBN-PUF in Listing 2. This includes both
the ABN described within the generate block (see also, Listing 1), and the synchronous
components within the always block. For N = 16, the module corresponds to the HBN-PUF
in Figure 1e.
1 module HBN_PUF( clk , r e s e t , cha l l enge , r e sponse ) ;
2
3 parameter N = 2 ;
4
5 input c l k ;
6 input r e s e t ;
7 input [N−1:0 ] cha l l eng e ;
8 output reg [N−1:0 ] r e sponse ;
9
10 wire [N−1:0 ] r ing_state /∗ s yn th e s i s keep ∗/ ;
11
12 genvar i ;
13 generate
14 f o r ( i =0; i<N; i=i +1) begin : generate_r ing
15 Node n (
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16 . r e s e t ( r e s e t ) ,
17 . c ha l l eng e ( cha l l eng e [ i ] ) ,
18 . i n l e f t ( r ing_state [ ( i+N−1)%N] ) ,
19 . i n r i g h t ( r ing_state [ ( i +1)%N] ) ,
20 . out ( r ing_state [ i ] )
21 ) ;
22 end
23 endgenerate
24
25 always @( posedge c l k ) begin
26 re sponse <= r ing_state ;
27 end
28
29 endmodule
